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GRAND JURY SECRECY AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY: BALANCING EFFECTIVE PROSECUTION





Criminal prosecutions of businessmen and the enterprises they serve
have occurred with increased frequency in the past several years. Prosecu-
tions for violations of every conceivable regulatory statute have been
brought. "Fraud Sections," which did not exist in most United States
Attorneys' Offices a decade ago, not only now flourish but have been ex-
panded in their activities and have been aptly redesignated as "Economic
Crimes" units.'
Administrative agencies, once thought to exist primarily to provide
regulatory expertise and guidance to businessmen and corporate entities
in congressionally selected areas, have emerged in recent years as the cut-
ting edge for new concepts in criminal prosecutions-referred to as "white-
collar crimes"-flowing from what previously were viewed as regulated
economic activities. "White-collar" prosecutions are not aberrational and
will continue at an accelerating rate. Congressional prodding will, in the
next few years, cause the evaporation of any reluctance to prosecute busi-
nessmen for economic activities now criminalized.
On June 21, 1978, the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United
States House of Representatives, announced that his committee, con-
cerned about the "general tolerance of white-collar crime," which he
viewed as "the most serious, all-pervasive, insidious crime problem in
America today," would institute "white-collar crime hearings which will
last for at least the next 18 months."' 2 Even more ominous for the American
* Arter, Hadden & Hemmendinger, Washington, D.C., formerly Assistant Director,
Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission.
** Staff Attorney, Division of Investment Management, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Washington, D.C. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of
policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication by any of its members or em-
ployees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the.views of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.
I Economic crime units have been or are being created in 27 United States Attorneys'
Offices. The New York Times, July 15, 1979, at 29, col. 2.
2 Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978). Representative Conyers observed that "white-collar crime destroys
the moral fabric of our cultural values." Id. He estimated that white-collar crime costs
Americans roughly $44 billion each year. When measurements of corporate antitrust viola-
tions were factored in, he "conservatively estimated" the figure to exceed $200 billion an-
nually. Id.
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business community was one of the questions which Representative Con-
yers stated his committee would address: "What are the major white-collar
crimes which the Congress, the Justice Department, the FBI and and the
regulatory agencies should be paying special attention to?"
'3
The Supreme Court recently recognized with approval the congres-
sional intent to involve regulatory agencies-a name which in the new era
of white-collar prosecutions is rapidly becoming a euphemism-in the
criminal prosecution of previously acceptable, or at least countenanced,
economic activities. In the context of reversing a denial to enforce two IRS
summonses,4 the Court stated that "Congress has created a law enforce-
ment system in which criminal and civil elements are inherently inter-
twined."' The intertwining of the regulatory agency with the criminal pro-
cess raises a number of serious problems for businessmen, corporate enter-
prises and their legal advisors, particularly in this era of governmentally
mandated disclosures of corporate activities to regulatory agencies.
This article examines one of those problems: the concern all citizens,
including members of congressional committees, have for balancing the
public's interest in prosecuting white-collar crime against the traditional
notions of grand jury secrecy. Underlying the questions raised in this area
is the concept that an administrative agency may not resort to a grand jury
to develop information for use in connection with civil or administrative
actions.8 Specifically, the historical evolution of grand jury secrecy will
serve as background for an analysis of the current judicial and legislative
approach to the problem of whether or not, to what degree and with what
safeguards, administrative agency personnel may be permitted to
"participate ' 7 in grand jury proceedings. Several suggestions that emerge
from this analysis indicate that the recent passion for prosecution of white-
collar crime does not obliterate constitutionally guaranteed rights.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The history of the grand jury can be traced to the Middle Ages.8 Some
3 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). Representative Conyers's remarks left little doubt that his
purpose was not to conduct post-mortem hearings for cases such as those involving "I.T.&T.,
Lockheed and Gulf Oil." Rather, his ultimate objective was "legislative reforms" designed
to produce more "white-collar" prosecutions. Id. at 3.
' United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978). LaSalle and its vice-
president had successfully blocked enforcement of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sum-
monses on the ground that the summonses had been issued to aid a criminal investigation.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 309.
See, e.g., United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978); United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
' Administrative agency personnel "participation" in grand jury proceedings will be
treated in its broadest sense; that is its use as Special Assistant United States Attorneys and
for "office assistance" in the form of analyzing grand jury and other materials.
Our fascination with and fear of the grand jury has prompted authors and courts to
discuss its genesis and the purpose for requiring that its deliberations remain secret. See, e.g.,
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authority exists for arguing that the concept of an accusing body drawn
from the citizenry traces its roots from ancient Athens, to the Saxons who
settled in England in the fifth and seventh centuries and the Scandinavi-
ans of the eighth century.9 However, the generally accepted view is that
the grand jury had its origins in the Assize of Clarendon issued by King
Henry ]I in 1166.10 The Assize of Clarendon drew from the community
persons who, under oath, and based upon their own knowledge, leveled
accusations against their neighbors. The Crown called forth the Assize,
which served by leave of the Crown, heard testimony, and deliberated in
public, essentially as an investigative arm of the King." In 1368, there
appeared an accusing body called "le grande inquest," consisting of
twenty-three persons empowered to hear witnesses and return accusations.
This body adopted the policy of hearing witnesses and deliberating in
secrecy.'2 Nevertheless, the wheels of justice turned slowly even in those
ancient times. Not until 1681 did the true independence of the grand jury
and the principle of grand jury secrecy become entrenched. In that year, a
jury composed of men whose names have long since been forgotten, dared
to defy the King. In the cases of the Earl of Shaftesbury, and Stephen
Colledge, 13 involving charges of treason, the King and his counsel insisted
that the grand jurors conduct their proceedings in public. The grand jurors
refused, successfully demanding that they be permitted to question wit-
nesses without the presence of the Royal prosecutors.'4 Adding insult to the
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82, n.6 (1958); United States v.
Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954); United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55
F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931); M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrAUs. THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION
ON TRIAL (1975) [hereinafter cited as FRANKEL & NAFTALIS]; Lacey, The Power of the Grand
Jury, ABA NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON REPRESENTING A CLIENT BEFORE THE GRAND JURY, 218
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Lacey]; Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. Rav. 455
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Calkins]. Note, Administrative Agency Access to Grand Jury
Materials Under Amended Rule 6(e), 29 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 295 (1978); Note,
Administrative Agency Access to Grand Jury Materials, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 162 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Agency Access]; Note, Recent Developments in the Law of the Federal
Grand Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 170.
1 See EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 26 (1906) [hereinafter cited as EDWARDS]; J. EHRLICH,
BLACKSTONE 904 (1959) (stating that the constitution of the grand jury as well as the number
of grand jurors, twenty-three with a majority of twelve, was fixed "so early as the laws of King
Ethelred"); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 312-27 (3d ed. 1922); J. STEPHEN,
A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 184-86, 250-58 (1883) (cited in Calkins, supra
note 8, at 456).
,1 One commentator suggests that the Assize of Clarenden was the precursor of the petit
jury rather than the grand jury which did not evolve until 1368. See EDWARDS, supra note 9.
We shall leave to the academicians the resolution of such debates.
" See Calkins, supra note 8, at 456-57; FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra note 8, at 6-8.
22 Calkins, supra note 8, at 457; Lacey, supra note 8, at 218.
" FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra note 8, at 9-10.
" Of course, the grand jurors were not yet common people but were "reelected from the
gentlemen of the best figure.in the country." In the Stephen Colledge case the grand jurors
were 24 knights. EDWARDS, supra note 9, at 28.
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Royal injury, the grand jurors refused to indict the defendants. 5 The
Shaftesbury and Colledge cases came to be recognized as bulwarks against
the oppression and despotism of the Crown. The concept of grand jury
proceedings being conducted in secrecy became a powerful factor in estab-
lishing the independence of the grand jury.
The English grand jury institution was brought by the colonists to
America and incorporated into the Constitution by the ratification of the
fifth amendment in 1791.16 The American constitutional grand jury was
designed to serve the same purposes and to operate in substantially the
same manner as its English progenitor. 7 The American grand jury was
created to provide a fair method for instituting criminal proceedings
against persons believed to have committed crimes. In order to serve that
function adequately the grand jury was made independent of the Execu-
tive and empowered to act in secrecy. It was not to be employed to elicit
evidence in civil cases. Indeed, as Justice Douglas stated, "[i]f the prose-
cution were using that device, it would be flouting public policy."' 8
From our Nation's earliest days, the belief in grand jury secrecy has
remained unchanged. The reasons often given for the need for grand jury
secrecy are:
1) to prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be con-
templated;
2) to insure the grand jury's freedom from outside influence in its
deliberations;
3) to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from
importuning the grand jurors;
4) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the wit-
ness who may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the
trial of those indicted by it;
5) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons
possessing information with respect to the commission of crimes;
6) to protect an innocent accused who is exonerated from disclo-
'5 Neither Shaftesbury nor Colledge escaped the Crown's wrath. The King arranged for
the Colledge Case to be presented to a more hospitable grand jury, which returned a true bill.
Colledge was convicted and executed. Shaftesbury fled the King's oppression to Holland
where he remained until his death two years later. FRANKEL & NAFrAus, supra note 8, at 10
n.2.
16 United States v. Costello, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1887). The adoption of the grand jury system in our Constitution as the sole method for
bringing felony criminal charges against our fellow citizens demonstrates the high place it
holds in our society as an instrument of justice.
17 350 U.S. at 362.
" United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. at 683. Justices Harlan, Burton, and
Frankfurter dissented from most of Justice Douglas's opinion. They joined him, however, in
the view that the institution of a grand jury solely to develop evidence for use in civil cases
is a misuse of the grand jury. Id. at 689. See J.R. Simplot Co. v. United States, 77-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9146 at 86,198 (9th Cir. 1976), withdrawn as moot on other grounds, 77-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9511 (9th Cir. 1977).
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sure of the fact that he has been the subject of an investigation,
and from the expense of standing trial where there was no proba-
bility of guilt.19
Originally, neither the Sovereign nor its agents could be present during the
grand jury's deliberations. The erosion of this ideal is significant in analyz-
ing the constitutional preservation of the tradition of grand jury secrecy.
As fear of governmental coercion of grand jurors lessened, prosecutors
began to appear in the grand jury room. The rule of secrecy was extended
to them. Ostensibly, the prosecutor's presence in the grand jury proceeding
was to assist in properly drawing the form of indictment desired by the
grand jury. This rationale evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, however, to the point where today the presence of the government's
representative is a commonly accepted right of the state. 0 Yet despite our
liberality in permitting the presence of representatives of the government
during grand jury examination of witnesses, two things remain clear. The
grand jury has retained broad inquisitorial powers to enable it to perform
its sole function of determining whether to institute criminal charges,2'
and Congress has not granted to administrative agencies unrestrained in-
quisitorial power comparable to that of a grand jury. That kind of power
should not be vested in the executive branch on an ongoing basis any more
than our forebears .were willing to vest it in, once having wrested it from,
the Crown.
22
However, Congress has given administrative agencies limited power to
decide whether to institute secret civil investigations of alleged violations
of statutes entrusted to them. That power often includes deciding whom
and what to investigate, and summoning citizens to appear before them
and give testimony under oath.? At the same time, Congress has seen fit
to criminalize certain types of economic activities, but has not shifted the
prosecutorial responsibility to those with the "expertise." Therefore, the
Department of Justice and the various United States Attorneys' Offices
often need the "expertise" of the various administrative agencies' staffs to
prosecute violators of these laws. When these criminal violations also are
the subject of civil prosecutions by the administrative agencies, the stage
is often set for the conduct of parallel proceedings 2 and for the use of
1" United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954). See Dennis v. United States,
384 U.S. 855 868-70 (1966); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6
(1958).
" Calkins, supra note 8, at 458.
21 See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956).
22 See Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1124
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (citing Agency Access, supra note 8, at 178-79).
" See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 78u (1976) (investigatory powers of Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) under the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of
1934, respectively).
24 For a discussion of the problems attending parallel proceedings, see Hassett, Ex Parte
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agency personnel by prosecutors to assist in grand jury proceedings. The
issues of whether agency personnel should be so utilized, and what precau-
tions should be taken to insure grand jury secrecy and to avoid even inad-
vertent subversion of the grand jury process have been the subject of much
scholarly and judicial debate.2 The recent amendments of Rule 6(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure evidence congressional cognizance of
the significance of these questions.
Once the traditional notion that representatives of the Sovereign could
not be present during grand jury deliberations was weakened, both prose-
cutors and a second group of government agents-administrative agency
personnel-marched into the grand jury room. The courts were then faced
with the problem of determining and controlling the scope of these incur-
sions into the previously sacrosanct environment of the grand jury.
Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, originally pro-
mulgated in 1945, codified prior case law governing access to grand jury
materials and implemented the tradition of grand jury secrecy. 6 The origi-
nal version of Rule 6(e) 7 provided that:
[d]isclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than
its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the
attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, op-
erator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded
testimony may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury
only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the Court at the
request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist
for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occur-
ring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be im-
posed upon any person except in accordance with this rule ....
Pre-Trial Discovery: The Real Vice Of Parallel Investigations, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1049
(1979); Pickholz, Parallel Enforcement Proceedings: Guidelines for the Corporate Lawyer, 7
SEC. REG. L. J. 99 (1979).
2 See, e.g., In re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dondich, 460 F.
Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal. 1978); J. R. Simplot Co. v. United States, 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas (CCH) T
9146 (9th Cir. 1977). See generally United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677
(1958); In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956); Robert Hawthorne,
Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Capitol Indem. Corp.
v. First Minn. Constr. Co., 405 F. Supp. 929 (D. Mass. 1975); United States v. Doe, 341 F.
Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D.
Pa. 1971).
1, See, In re Report & Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219,
1227 (D.D.C. 1974).
21 Congress amended Rule 6(e) in April, 1977. See text accompanying notes 65-78 infra.
The prohibitions against disclosure do not run to the witness since the tradition of
grand jury secrecy stems from the desire to protect the grand jurors. Moreover, one who
testifies before the grand jury should assume that his testimony ultimately will be disclosed
to the defendant and may be required in any subsequent trial.
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In the context of agency personnel appearing before grand juries as assist-
ants to the prosecution, the logical interpretive question under Rule 6(e)
became whether agency personnel are "attorneys for the government" to
whom the Rule permitted disclosure of grand jury matters.
Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure defines Attorney
for the Government to include "the Attorney General, an authorized assist-
ant of the Attorney General, [or] a United States Attorney. . . ." Neither
counsel for administrative agencies nor state, county or municipal attor-
neys have been viewed as "attorneys for the government."29 Nevertheless,
because grand juries frequently are involved in analyzing technical materi-
als-particularly in "white-collar" criminal investigations-they, and the
prosecutors, have developed the practice of turning to administrative agen-
cies such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) for expert assistance.
Agency personnel usually assist prosecutors conducting grand juries
either as sworn Special Assistant United States Attorneys or by simply
providing "office assistance" to the supervising Assistant United States
Attorney. The designation of agency personnel as "special assistants" is
now well-entrenched 0 and, because of certain safeguards imposed by the
prosecutors,3' is less troublesome if the agency personnel are not the same
29 See, e.g., Special Feb. 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 29 F.R.D. 151 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd 309 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1962);
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. Da-
neals, 370 F. Supp. 1289, 1296-97 (W.D.N.Y. 1974). Arguably, even members of the Depart-
ment of Justice's Civil Division and Assistant United States Attorneys assigned to local office
civil divisions are not included within the definition of "attorneys-for the government" for
purposes of disclosing to them grand jury materials. Capitol Indem. Co. v. First Min. Constr.
Co., 405 F. Supp. 929, 932 (D. Mass. 1975).
" See United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1125 n.7 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 917 (1978); United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 43 (6th Cir. 1965); Robert Hawthorne,
Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1118 (E.D. Pa. 1976); In re William
H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Anzelmo, 319 F.
Supp. 1106 (E.D. La. 1970) (disclosure to SEC attorney and accountant); United States v.
Culver, 224 F. Supp. 419 (D. Md. 1963).
31 Currently, a Rule 6(e) disclosure by prosecutors to agency representatives assisting
them follows a procedure consistent with the July 30, 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e). See text
accompanying note 87 infra. The United States Attorney sends a letter to the appropriate
agency or agent stating that certain grand jury material is being disclosed to the agent
pursuant to Rule 6(e)(2)(A) subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 6(e)(2)(B). Subdivi-
sion (B) is quoted to the addressee with the admonition that the disclosed information may
not be utilized by him or his agency "for any purpose other than assisting the attorney for
the government in the performance of such attorney's duties to enforce the Federal criminal
law." The addressee is further informed that, pursuant to amended Rule 6(e), his name has
been or will be supplied to the district court as a person to whom disclosure was made. The
agent is instructed that if it becomes necessary for him to discuss or disclose grand jury
materials with other members of his agency, he is to provide the United States Attorney with
their names so that this information can be reported to the court. Finally, the agent to whom
disclosure" is made is instructed to advise the United States Attorney promptly of the status
of the investigative steps instituted by him based upon the grand jury materials disclosed to
him. In addition, the United States Attorney also addresses a letter to the Chief Judge of the
1979] 1033
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individuals charged with prosecuting an on-going civil action.
The Attorney General's power to appoint Special Assistant United
States Attorneys to conduct "any kind of legal proceeding ... including
grand jury proceedings" is granted by 28 U.S.C. § 515(a). That section was
originally enacted in 19062 in response to United States v. Rosenthal3
where the Second Circuit held that only a United States Attorney or one
of his assistants, but not a special assistant, could present matters to a
grand jury. The House Committee Report indicated that the new legisla-
tion was in direct response to the Rosenthal decision:
[The Rosenthal] decision makes the proposed legislation neces-
sary if the Government is to have the benefit of the knowledge and
learning of its Attorney General and his assistants, or of such spe-
cial counsel as the Attorney General may deem necessary to em-
ploy to assist in the prosecution of a special case, either civil or
criminal. As the law now stands, only the district attorney has any
authority to appear before a grand jury. no matter how important
the case may be and no matter how necessary it may be to the
interests of the Government to have the assistance of one who is
specially or particularly qualified by reasons of his peculiar knowl-
edge and skill to properly present to the grand jury the question
being considered by it.
31
One court has expressed the view that the powers implied by the broad
language of 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) nevertheless are limited by factors unex-
district, advising the court that a Rule 6(e) disclosure has been made, indicating what alleged
violations are being investigated, and naming the agency and person to whom disclosure has
been made. See Lacey, supra note 8, at 228-29 (citing United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d
1120 (3d Cir. 1977)). This procedure, which does not require prior court approval or an
adversary hearing, may not be totally satisfactory in certain instances. See text accompany-
ing notes 79-85 infra.
32 Act of June 30, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-404, ch. 3935, 34 Stat. 816 (1906).
- 121 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1903).
31 H.R. REP. No. 2901, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1906). Having expressed its disagree-
ment with the holding in Rosenthal, the House Committee stated:
If such a law [permitting the appointment of Special Assistant United States
Attorneys] is necessary to enable the Government to properly prosecute those who
are violating its laws, it is no argument against it that some grand jury may be,
perhaps, unduly influenced by the demands or importunities that may be made
upon it by such special counsel. The same argument can as well be made against
permitting a district attorney from attending a sitting of such jury.
There can be no doubt of the advisability of permitting the Attorney General
to employ special counsel in special cases, and there can be no question that if he
has been employed because of his special fitness for such a special case that the
Government should have the full advantage of his learning and skill in every step
necessary to be taken before the trial, including that of appearing before grand
juries.
Id. See also In re Subpoena of Alphonse Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 56-60 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Wrigley, 520 F.2d 362, 365-67 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
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pressed in the statute." One such limitation may be the prior experience
of the specially appointed Assistant United States Attorney which might
disqualify him from conducting a particular grand jury investigation." The
necessity for an agency attorney, appointed as a Special Assistant United
States Attorney, to serve as both advocate and witness before the same
grand jury would present another instance in which a limitation should be
imposed upon the Attorney General's appointment power.
The Third Circuit recently sustained convictions for conspiracy, mail
fraud and securities fraud notwithstanding the appearance before the
grand jury of an SEC attorney in both his capacity as a Special Assistant
United States Attorney and as a witness. 7 While noting that an agency
attorney representing different agencies of the government is not engaged
in the kind of conflict of interest proscribed by the ABA Standards Relat-
ing to the Prosecution Function-and to hold otherwise would frustrate
intergovernmental cooperation in criminal prosecutions-the Third Cir-
cuit condemned the practice of an attorney serving both as a prosecutor
and witness in grand jury proceedings. The court held that by implication
the Code of Professional Responsibility's prohibition against a prosecutor's
appearing as both counsel and a witness at trial applied to grand jury
proceedings. The prosecutor required to appear as a witness before the
grand jury, according to the Third Circuit, should likewise withdraw from
the grand jury process.
With the advent in the 1930's of numerous regulatory agencies, each of
which possessed an expertise deemed necessary to assist prosecutors and
grand juries, came the beginning of serious questioning of the assistance
procedure and more frequent examination by the courts of the constitu-
tional and procedural problems created by such agency assistance. Begin-
ning in the 1970's, regulatory agencies showed more inclination to refer
economic violations of the statutes they administer for criminal prosecu-
tion, and prosecutors became more interested in developing those cases.
The courts too began to reexamine the problems attendant to white-collar
prosecutions. The judicial approach to the problem, exemplified in a series
of district and circuit court decisions, led to congressional amendment of
Rule 6(e) in July 1977.38
In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc.3" was the first of the cases that
prompted the Rule 6(e) amendment. In Pflaumer, the district court denied
the defendant petitioner's motion for a protective order in which he sought
to prevent IRS agents from gaining access to materials he had turned over
to the grand jury pursuant to subpoena. Interestingly, the United States
Attorney admitted that there was no way to prevent the IRS agents from
In re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978).
3 Id. at 264.
3, United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1979).
' See S. REP. No. 354, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 527, 529 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
3, 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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using the facts and information they learned while providing technical
assistance to the prosecutor and the grand jury after that assistance ended.
Furthermore, the United States Attorney admitted that it would be impro-
per for the IRS to utilize the information in connection with a civil tax
prosecution. 0 Nevertheless, the court held that a protective order would
not issue "so long as [the records] remain under the aegis of attorneys for
the government."'" However, the court's ruling was made with reserva-
tions, since it was faced with the seemingly contrary authority of In re
Grand Jury Proceedings." Pflaumer was unique because the record before
the court did not demonstrate that the Government commenced the crimi-
nal proceeding merely to obtain evidence which it could not otherwise
obtain, that the IRS appeared to be acting in "good faith" and that the
United States Attorney retained supervision of the records. Moreover, the
court manifested its concern for the implications of its holding by suggest-
ing that the Supreme Court reevaluate Rule 6(e).43 In the five years be-
tween the Pflaumer decision and the Supreme Court's amendment of Rule
6(e), the same district judge called upon to decide Pflaumer found himself
confronted with Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue.44
The plaintiff in Hawthorne sought, alternatively, an injunction against
continuation of a grand jury investigation as to it, or an order restraining
an alleged breach of grand jury secrecy stemming from the disclosure of
certain subpoenaed materials to the IRS pursuant to court order. The
company also tried to recover certain of its corporate records then
"repos[ing] in the offices of the IRS, though under the aegis of the United
States Attorney."
'45
The plaintiffs allegations of Rule 6(e) violations included the prosecu-
tor's failure to adequately advise the IRS's employees of their limited
4o Id. at 466-67.
' Id. at 477. The rationale of the "aegis" requirement seems to be that it impresses upon
the agency the limited nature and purpose of its access. See Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v.
Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1108 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
42 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962) (FTC attorneys denied free access to corporate documents
to aid them in administrative investigation).
11 53 F.R.D. at 475-76. Even prior to the amendment of Rule 6(e), courts generally had
permitted prosecutors to disclose grand jury materials to agency personnel assisting in the
conduct of a grand jury investigation, or in preparation for trial, without requiring that the
personnel be appointed a Special Assistant United States Attorney. See, e.g., Coson v. United
States, 533 F.2d 1119, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Evans, 526 F.2d 701, 707 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 43 (6th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993, 1015 (D.N.J. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 450
F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971).
" 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
' Id. at 1103. Documents that have been removed from the physical custody and control
of a United States Attorney should not be deemed to remain under his "aegis." To so deem
them, thereby lending credibility to the belief that they were still not subject to, or were at
least less susceptible to, misuse, simply ignores the true nature of human activity. An unjusti-
fiable risk of abuse thus is imposed on the affected party (as well as the concept of grand
jury secrecy).
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access to grand jury materials, to swear them to secrecy, and to advise
them that the materials must remain under the aegis of the United States
Attorney. The plaintiff also charged that subpoenaed documents had been
delivered directly to the IRS, rather than to the United States Attorney or
the grand jury room, and that the IRS retained the documents. Finally,
plaintiff took exception to the United States Attorney's failure to directly
supervise the activities of the IRS agents and to his failure to even learn
the names of the IRS agents working on the case."
Although dismissing the plaintiff's claims for lack of factual support,
the court voiced its concern "as to the manner in which the Rule 6(e) orders
were implemented in this case and apparently in general." Since the "sole
authority cited by the parties as a frame of reference for determining
compliance with a Rule 6(e) order" was the court's earlier decision in
Pflaumer, the court determined that "further judicial explication" was
proper as well as necessary. 7 The court then set forth its "suggestions"
regarding the proper procedure to be followed when agency personnel are
granted access to grand jury materials.
1) There should be a strict showing of necessity before any request for
the interpretive assistance of the administrative agency is granted."
2) The agency personnel should be sworn to secrecy and comprehen-
sive written instructions should be given to them and to their supervisors
making clear the limited nature of the agency's access to the materials."
3) The United States Attorney should certify to the court that the
grand jury records have been segregated from general agency files, and
secured and marked as grand jury records.
50
4) The United States Attorney should keep a Rule 6(e) docket. It
would contain recordations of a general description of the investigation as
set forth in the Rule 6(e) application, the identity of all agency personnel
with access to the relevant material and their relevant supervisors, and the
identity of the Assistant United States Attorney supervising the investiga-
tion. Particular grand jury materials would be generally identified, and the
dates on which they were received and first considered would be noted.
Finally, the Rule 6(e) docket would indicate the date on which the admin-
istrative agency's technical assistance terminated."
The Hawthorne court believed itself powerless to impose its
"suggestions" on the United States Attorney, except in the case before it.
It viewed its supervisory power over the grand jury "[as] repos[ing] in
the entire Court and not in a single judge.""S The court's timidity seems
to ignore the facts that the court summons the grand jury, the court's clerk
Id. at 1103 n.3.
Id. at 1104.
" Id. at 1125 n.49.
, Id. at 1125-26.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1127.
52 Id. at 1128.
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works closely with the United States Attorney to schedule matters before
the court" and that the United States Attorney is an officer of and subject
to the control of the court."
Perhaps the reluctance of district courts to directly confront procedures
and practices of prosecutors derives from our judiciary's tradition of re-
fraining from assuming too great a role in the actual conduct of a trial.
Unfortunately, this tradition appears to have led to the judiciary's with-
drawal from active direction of grand jury proceedings, which, in turn, has
diminished respect for and trust in the grand jury as a bulwark between
the citizen and the Government.55
The Hawthorne court had submitted its earlier order in Pflaumer to the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States. The court decided to do so with its decision in
Hawthorne as well. 7
Soon after Hawthorne was decided, the Ninth Circuit confronted a
similar issue in J. R. Simplot Co. v. United States,5" in which the petitioner
challenged the civil use of grand jury materials which had been shown to
twenty-four IRS agents assisting the grand jury. The Simplot opinion,
written by Judge Hufstedler, put the brakes on agency access to grand jury
materials, even for the purpose of rendering technical assistance. If fol-
lowed in other circuits, and had Congress not amended Rule 6(e), 59
Simplot's holding would have substantially curtailed, if not totally pre-
vented, access to grand jury materials by agency personnel. Judge Huf-
stedler began her opinion by observing forcefully that "the grand jury is a
constitutional entity under court supervision, not a tool available for Exec-
utive branch purposes.""0 Moreover, she stated that the reason for its exist-
"s Id. at 1105. Accord, J.R. Simplot Co. v. United States, 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9146 at 86,197 (9th Cir. 1976) ("the grand jury is a constitutional entity under court supervi-
sion, not a tool available for Executive branch purposes").
5' 406 F. Supp. at 1126.
" The Hawthorne court made even more disquieting observations. It expressed the view
that the grand jury and "the grand jurors themselves do play some role in the decision making
process." Id. at 1119 (emphasis added). Moreover, the court believed that its "findings of fact
fairly and substantially support[ed] the claim that the grand jury is essentially controlled
by the United States Attorney and is his prosecutorial tool." Id. Justice Douglas has also
commented that the grand jury "is now a tool of the Executive" in the eyes of the general
public. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
406 F. Supp. at 1121.
5 Id. at 1126 n.54. The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, in its January 31, 1973
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the United States District Courts recommended amending Rule 6(e). The Advisory Commit-
tee suggested adding the phrase: "For purposes of this subdivision, attorneys for the govern-
ment includes those enumerated in rule 54(c); it also includes such other government person-
nel as are necessary to assist the attorneys for the government in the performance of their
duties." Id. at 1121.
11 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9146 (9th Cir. 1976).
5' See text accompanying notes 66-78 infra.
60 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9146 at 86,197 (citing Agency Access, supra note 8, at 175-
84.) See also In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp.
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ence is not served, and the power it possesses for "massive intrusions upon
freedom and privacy"'" is not justified, if used in aid of a civil case. Indeed,
the court stated, "[sluch use is in itself an abuse of the grand jury. ' 2
The court then went on to enunciate "principles" relative to the use of
agency personnel in connection with grand jury proceedings. Judge Huf-
stedler suggested that the district courts draw "guidelines" to maintain the
secrecy of the grand jury, and recommended "the thoughtful approach
taken in" the Hawthorne case. 3 Specifically, the court stated that before
disclosure of grand jury material is made to agency personnel, "the Gov-
ernment must show the necessity for each particular person's aid rather
than showing merely a general necessity for assistance."64 According to
Judge Hufstedler, "absent an explanation for the failure to use qualified
personnel within the Justice Department, the Government cannot carry its
burden of showing that outside personnel are necessary."" Two additional
requirements were viewed by the Simplot court as so basic to the preserva-
tion of values served by grand jury secrecy that they should be explicitly
stated:
(1) on appropriate request, the agency must identify the source
of its information in a civil case that was preceded by a grand jury
investigation in which its personnel were used to assist the prose-
cutor in presenting a case to the grand jury; and
(2) upon a motion to suppress in the civil proceeding, the agency
bears the burden of proving an independent source for the informa-
tion.6
Clarifying its words, and removing their onerous impact, the court ob-
served that it intended to require no more than the type of hearing to which
the Government presently must submit when it seeks to use evidence in a
grand jury investigation which is allegedly inadmissible because it was
secured through an allegedly unlawful act."
AMENDED RULE 6
The Hawthorne' and Simplot courts were wrestling with the real prob-
lem of balancing traditional grand jury secrecy against what the United
States Senate called the "increasing need on the part of Government attor-
1219, 1222 (D.D.C. 1974) (grand jury frequently has been characterized as an adjunct or arm
of the judiciary).
" 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9146 at 86,198 (citing Agency Access, supra note 8, at 177).
82 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9146 at 86,198.
'3 Id. at 86,199 n.17. The court also suggested that the Department of Justice prescribe
guidelines "regarding civil use by its employees" of grand jury materials as a means to
"prevent analogous abuses." Id. at 86,199 n.16.
" Id. at 86,198.
SId.
Id. at 86,199.
'7 Id. at 86,199 n.18; see 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1976).
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neys to make use of outside expertise in complex litigation."68 The Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, and the Supreme Court itself, soon began to consider
the concerns expressed by the judiciary. 9
On April 26, 1976, the Supreme Court proposed an amendment to Rule
6(e) to take effect on August 1, 1976,10 which was delayed by Congress until
August 1, 1977.1 The Supreme Court's proposed amendment" engendered
congressional concern that the proposed clarification allowing administra-
tive agency assistance to grand jury proceedings might lead to an abuse of
the grand jury's powers.
The House and Senate Committees considering the proposed amend-
ments to Rule 6(e) emerged from their deliberations with different views."
The House rejected the Supreme Court's proposed amendment 4 because,
in its view, the "proposed substantive changes will not clarify the present
situation and may even lead to further unclarity."75 It was "feared that the
proposed change would allow Government agency personnel to obtain
grand jury information which they could later use in connection with an
unrelated civil or criminal case."7 The House also expressed concern that
"[t]his would enable those agencies to circumvent statutes that specifi-
cally circumscribe the investigative procedures otherwise available to
them." 7
The Senate, recognizing the divergent interests of grand jury secrecy
and governmental access to expert assistance,7 8 favored the Supreme
Court's proposal. Judicial decisions, including Simplot and Hawthorne,
which the Senate viewed as "highly restrictive of the use of government
" SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 6, [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 529.
" See Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1121
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
" COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 464,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 195, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as HOUSE REPORT].
71 Act of July 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-349, 90 Stat. 822 (1976).
72 The Supreme Court's proposal adopted the amendatory language contained in the
January 31, 1973 Preliminary Draft prepared by the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules.
See note 57 supra.
73 Compare HOUSE REPORT, supra, note 70, with SENATE REPORT, supra note 38.
71 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 5.
71 Id. at 5, n.9.
71 Id. at 4.
77 Id. Representative Wiggins disagreed with his colleagues about their concerns over
disclosures of grand jury materials. He found "no reason for a barrier of secrecy to exist
between the facets of the criminal justice system which we all depend on to enforce the
criminal laws." According to Representative Wiggins, preventing disclosures between Gov-
ernment agents investigating violations of federal criminal law would neither serve the poli-
cies underlying grand jury secrecy nor prevent the feared abuses of disclosure. Id.
71 SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 6. The Senate's Report incorporated Representative
Wiggins' argument that disclosure barriers amounted to walls between different facets of the
same criminal justice system. Id.
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experts,"7 particularly concerned the Senate. The Senate version, ulti-
mately adopted as Amended Rule 6(e), states in pertinent part:
(1) GENERAL RULE. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenogra-
pher, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes
recorded testimony, an attorney for the Government,80 or any per-
son to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (2)(A)(ii) of this
subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation
of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance
with this rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as
a contempt of court.
(2) EXCEPTIONS.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters
occurring before the grand jury, other than its deliberations
and the vote of any juror, may be made to-
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the perform-
ance of such attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by
an attorney for the government in the performance of such
attorney's duty to enforce Federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under sub-
paragraph A(ii) of this paragraph shall not utilize that grand
jury material for any purpose other than assisting the attor-
ney for the government in the performance of such attorney's
duty to enforce Federal criminal law. An attorney for the
government shall promptly provide the district court, before
which was impaneled the grand jury whose material has been
disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom such disclo-
sure was made."
The Senate appeared sanguine that with its amendment to Rule 6(e)
it had removed the restrictions on use of government experts imposed by
cases like Simplot and Hawthorne while facilitating "resolution of subse-
quent claims of improper disclosure." Speedy resolution of disputes would
be achieved through disclosure to the district court of the names of govern-
ment personnel designated to assist the attorney for the government and
the limitations the Rule placed on the government personnel's use of grand
jury material.82 Its Report also evidenced the Senate's satisfaction that,
Id. at 7, n.10.
Amended Rule 6(e) did not change the definition of "attorneys for the government"
found in Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See text accompanying note
29 supra.
M Act of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, § 2, 91 Stat. 319 (1977) (emphasis added).
" SENATE REPoRT, supra note 38, at 7-8.
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although not expressly required by the rule, "the names of [agency person-
nel to whom disclosure was contemplated] will generally be furnished to
the court before disclosure is made to them.""3
Subsequent decisions have viewed amended Rule 6(e) as overturning
the Simplot and Hawthorne line of cases. Courts have looked upon
amended Rule 6(e) as sanitizing the appearance of an agency attorney
before the grand jury once he is appointed a Special Assistant United
States Attorney. The cases present the view that the amendment indicates
"the continuing Congressional support for interagency cooperation and the
active participation of agency personnel, including agency attorneys, in
grand jury proceedings." 4 However, neither those cases nor the legislative
history of amended Rule 6(e) satisfies the objections and concerns pre-
viously expressed by the courts and targets of grand jury investigations."
The Senate Committee echoed the concerns expressed during the hear-
ings on the proposed amendment to Rule 6(e), that to require a "necessity
hearing" would "burden" the government unnecessarily since "civil mis-
use can be raised in subsequent civil proceedings." 6 The Senate Commit-
tee, however, missed the point.
If the grand jury is to remain a bulwark against threatened oppression
and retain its respected position among the populace, justice cannot be
measured in terms of expendiency and "burdens" on the government or
the court system. Fundamental principles must be preserved. Justice must
be done in fact as well as in appearance. Furthermore, as the former Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
observed, the right to challenge an allegedly improper disclosure upon
appeal in a civil case, in practical terms, is meaningless. The secrecy is
13 Id. at 8.
" In re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260, 267 (7th Cir. 1978). See also United States v. Dondich, 460
F. Supp. 849, 857-58 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (approving the appearance before the grand jury of the
SEC attorney responsible for a concluded civil action after his appointment as a Special
Assistant United States Attorney); United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 563 (3d Cir.
1979).
" Indeed, the concern that administrative agencies may gain insights they previously
lacked by virtue of the participation of their employees in grand jury proceedings seems to
have been confirmed adversely to those subject to grand jury proceedings. The Senate Report
made clear that:
[t]here is, however, no intent to preclude the use of grand jury-developed evidence
for civil law enforcement purposes. On the contrary, there is no reason why such
use is improper, assuming that the grand jury was utilized for the legitimate pur-
pose of a criminal investigation. Accordingly, the Committee believes and intends
that the basis for a Court's refusal to issue an order under paragraph (C') to enable
the government to disclose grand jury information in a non-criminal proceeding
should be no more restrictive than is the case today under prevailing court deci-
sions.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 7 n.12 (footnote omitted).
86 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 7 n.12. See also Coson v. United States, 533 F.2d
1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 1976); Hearings on H.R. 5864 Before Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1977).
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gone. A subsequent determination that the release of grand jury informa-
tion was improper will not undo the damage to the principle of secrecy8
7
Nevertheless, subparagraph (2)(A)(ii) of amended Rule 6(e) leaves to
the "attorney for the government" the determination of when and to what
extent he finds it necessary to secure the assistance of agency personnel.
The government is not required to certify to the court that the assistance
is required or that it cannot be secured from within the Department of
Justice.M In short, a "necessity hearing" is not required. Subjects of grand
jury investigations are left to trust in the "good faith" of the government,
a solution that neither satisfies them nor adequately addresses the prob-
lem. The courts are not precluded by amended Rule 6(e) from issuing
discretionary orders, in the exercise of their general supervisory powers
over the grand jury, embodying the types of restrictions referred to in
Simplot and Hawthorne but not incorporated in the amendment. 9
PROCEDURES FOR ASSURING SECRECY
By this late date in our jurisprudence it is clear that the Legislative,
Judicial and Executive branches of our Government are in agreement that
the complex nature of white-collar criminal prosecutions requires the tech-
nical assistance of experts from administrative agencies. We do not chal-
lenge that perception. Indeed, we concur with it.
Despite the current political rhetoric deprecating and demeaning the
federal employee, the overwhelming majority of administrative agencies
and their personnel are extremely able, dedicated public servants desiring
to perform their jobs in a productive, lawful manner. The agencies do not
exhibit a conscious effort or desire to violate the law, in fact or in spirit,
or to trample on the rights of citizens. To the average citizen, however, the
" Baker v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.2d 1074, 1080-81 (2d Cir. 1974) (Lumbard,
J., dissenting).
" One of the authors was counsel in an action in which the lack of a requirement that
the government certify the need for a particular expert was graphically illustrated. The
Assistant United States Attorney argued that a member of a foreign police organization was
a necessary witness before the grand jury to provide the jurors with his accounting expertise.
The court expressed its disbelief that the government could not find an accounting expert
within itself, or among the general citizenry. Although the foreign police organization was
investigating one of the targets of the grand jury, the expert was permitted access to informa-
tion gathered by the grand jury. Other than restricting the witness from making notes from
or copies of documents shown to him, the court stated that it was powerless to prevent the
grand jury from calling the foreign police official.
81 See Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. at 1125-28.
More recently, Chief Justice Burger proposed further amendments to Rule 6(e) which, if
enacted, would recaption Rule 6(e)(1) to read "General Rule of Secrecy." The amendment
would require that "all proceedings" before the grand jury, except when it is deliberating or
voting, "be recorded stenographically or by electronic device." Moreover, the amendment
specifically provides that "if a court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand
jury, the disclosure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions
as the court may direct." COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 112, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 63-66 (1979).
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"bureaucracy" is a seemingly massive, faceless and nameless web of indi-
viduals. This lack of intimacy between the government and its citizens,
and the manner in which it carries out its functions, necessitates that the
citzenry be comforted by the existence of procedures designed to assure
that basic protections and safeguards are in place and administered for the
preservation of rights deemed essential by all citizens. In the context of
agency assistance to grand juries, these procedures could be created with
relative ease, thereby guaranteeing that prosecutors, and agency personnel
providing technical assistance to grand juries, comply with the fundamen-
tal requirement of secrecy.
Administrative agencies that refer matters to the Attorney General for
possible criminal prosecution, or provide personnel to assist in white-collar
criminal prosecutions, should establish separate units whose sole function
would be to provide whatever technical assistance prosecutors and grand
juries require."0 Personnel in those units should be segregated from other
law enforcement functions of the agency. Agency personnel assigned to
investigate possible civil or adminstrative violations should not be as-
signed to assist prosecutors and grand juries unless civil actions have been
concluded 9 or a determination made not to pursue a civil remedy. On
those infrequent occasions when failure to assign knowledgeable agency
personnel involved with a civil investigation would result in the running
of a criminal statute of limitations, the same personnel could be assigned
to assist in the criminal proceeding provided certain additional precau-
tions were taken. For example, at the time such agency personnel are
assigned to assist with the criminal proceedings, the agency and the United
States Attorney might submit to the court in charge of the grand jury a
sworn statement describing the need for assignment of the particular indi-
viduals, the nature and status of the civil investigation, a list of all docu-
mentary and testimonial evidence gathered to that date in the civil matter,
and a statement of what further investigative steps are contemplated. The
court could then seal the certification until such time as it might become
necessary, on a motion to suppress evidence in a subsequent civil prosecu-
tion, for the agency to demonstrate that it did not improperly benefit from
the grand jury investigation. " Additionally, there is no logical reason to
90 The IRS and SEC have established special technical assistance units. However, be-
cause of inadequate budgets and personnel shortages persons in those units occasionally are
assigned to civil or administrative cases in addition to their other duties. Consequently, the
possibility of overlapping functions exists, thereby decreasing the efficacy of the agencies'
corrective efforts.
" See United States v. Dondich, 460 F. Supp. 849, 856-57 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
', The IRS already has instituted procedures to protect itself against claims that it
benefited from its participation in grand jury proceedings. The IRS's internal manual for
agents states:
[tlo prevent doubt about the origins of information available for civil use, informa-
tion in the possession of the Service prior to receipt by Service personnel of any
grand jury information must be identified by preparing comprehensive records,
with appropriate indexes and descriptions, of such information as to the moment
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require supervisors of agency personnel assigned to assist grand juries to
swear an oath of secrecy. Those supervisors need not know the nature of
the information being developed by the grand jury. Their sole need, as
supervisors, is to be kept advised by the prosecutors that the personnel
detailed to provide technical assistance are, in fact, appearing for work and
are performing in a satisfactory professional manner. Also, agency person-
nel need not be authorized to receive, or maintain at the agency's offices,
documents subpoenaed in the name of or received by the grand jury, tran-
scripts of statements made before the grand jury, or notes thereof. Notes,
digests of testimony, and similar "work product" given to or made by
agency personnel assisting in grand jury proceedings should remain in the
custody of the United States Attorney. The assigned personnel should be
provided with work accommodations by the United States Attorney whom
they are assigned to assist. This procedure would also obviate the need for
metaphysical arguments as to whether documents located at an agency's
offices are under the "aegis" of the prosecutor and have remained secure
from unauthorized review.
United States Attorneys requiring the assistance of agency personnel
should advise the supervising court of the names of such personnel and the
reasons their assistance is necessary. 3 Agency personnel should be sworn
to secrecy and given comprehensive written instructions describing stan-
dards for their proper conduct, particularly with regard to their obligation
to preserve grand jury secrecy. 4 An additional written admonishment
might be a directive that information learned by the agency personnel is
not to be revealed to colleagues or supervisors and that any request by such
persons should be reported immediately to the Assistant United States
Attorney supervising the grand jury investigation.
If the agency assistant is the same individual conducting a parallel civil
proceeding, he should be required to so advise the Assistant United States
Attorney. The court should be informed of the investigative steps being
taken in the civil investigation, and a certificate should be provided to the
preceding receipt. Thereafter, any related information obtained by the Service
totally apart from grand jury information should similarly be recorded and its
independent source identified.
Cited in Note, Administrative Agency Access To Grand Jury Material Under Amended Rule
6(e), 29 CASE W. RFs. L. REV. 295, 313 n.117.
,3 See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra. The Senate Report accompanying amended
Rule 6(e) does not require a "necessity" hearing. Decisions rendered under the old Rule
required an adversary hearing before an order pursuant to the Rule was issued. See, e.g.,
United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1960); In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 76-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (ex parte application by SEC for
disclosure of grand jury materials denied and considered on renewal with notice to defen-
dant).
" There is no basis on which to distinguish the applicability of protective procedures
when an agency representative merely renders "office assistance," such as analyses of docu-
ments, as opposed to being sworn in a Special Assistant United States Attorney. The dangers
of abuse exist in both situations and both require additional procedural safeguards.
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court attesting to the fact that neither leads nor information derived from
the grand jury proceeding have been, or will be, employed in advancing
the civil inquiry. United States Attorneys should adopt the practice of
prohibiting delivery of grand jury subpoenaed records either to the agency
personnel at their agency's offices or to the Assistant United States Attor-
ney at his offices. The records should be delivered directly to the grand jury
where the owner or a custodian of those records would be required to
submit to examination to determine what procedures were followed to
insure full compliance with the subpoena and that the records are genuine
and authentic. 5
Finally, a Rule 6(e) docket should be prepared and maintained. The
docket should indicate the dates documents are received, where they are
stored, and the identity of persons having access to the grand jury materi-
als. If copies of the materials were made, the number of copies made and
to whom such copies were given should be recorded. A list of materials that
were received and used by the agency personnel, the date the assistance
terminated, and a certificate by the administrative agency personnel that
they did not disclose any grand jury information to their supervisors or
anyone else not involved in that particular investigation, except when
ordered to do so by the court should complete the Rule 6(e) docket.
Counsel for persons requested to provide information to a grand jury
should consider the merits of insisting upon a Rule 6(e) order and the
creation of a Rule 6(e) docket. At the least, such an application would
secure from the Government a list of all Government personnel to whom
grand jury information is to be disclosed and effectively would require the
Government to justify the use of agency personnel. Moreover, such an
application permits the court, in the exercise of its general supervisory
powers over the grand jury,9" to impose any number of the above sugges-
tions that it deems appropriate since grand jury records are records of the
court.97 Counsel also should seek an agreement whereby documents re-
ceived by the grand jury or the United States Attorney, any information
contained therein, and even the fact of their existence, will not be given
or communicated to other agencies. Regardless of whether an indictment
has been returned, an attorney should ask for an order requiring that he
receive notice before a Rule 6(e) order is granted during or after the grand
jury proceeding. Lastly, counsel should request an order directing the
Is The requirement that the producing party testify, in addition to assuring compliance
with procedural safeguards, has the ancillary benefit of impressing upon the witness the
seriousness of his role in the grand jury process and the need for his candid testimony.
Is See J.R. Simplot Co. v. United States, 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9146 (9th Cir.
1977); Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1104-07
(E.D. Pa. 1976); text accompanying notes 44-67 supra.
"7 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 685 (1957) (Whittaker, J.,
concurring).
19 By requesting that he be given notice before a Rule 6(e) order issues, and that the
notice be given whether or not an indictment results, an attorney may successfully preclude
disclosure of documents to agency personnel for their "intrinsic value." This justification for
GRAND JURY SECRECY
United States Attorney supervising the grand jury proceeding to provide
to the court, at the time an indictment is returned, a certificate in which
he and any agency personnel assisting him attest that they have complied
with all the conditions imposed by the court."
CONCLUSION
Amended Rule 6(e) is intended to clarify prior case law interpreting its
predecessor section and to enumerate certain standards of conduct in
connection with what is generally agreed to be the necessary assistance of
agency personnel in grand jury proceedings. However, the amended Rule
fails to address a number of concerns, including the public's perception of
the fairness of the procedure. The potential for abuse, or at least misunder-
standing, in the application of the Amended Rule exists. To the extent that
even misunderstandings abound, the entire criminal process suffers from
a lack of public trust. The suggestions and comments made here, if
adopted, will alleviate some of the problems and assuage a number of the
concerns.
disclosure has been accepted by federal courts in the past. See, e.g., United States v. Inter-
state Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1960).
11 See generally, Cys & Rezneck, The Sharing of Information Among Government Enti-
ties During Parallel Grand Jury and Administrative Agency Investigations, in ABA NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON PARALLEL GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS: THE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL IMPLICATIONS FOR
CORPORATIONS AND THEIR OFFCERS (1978).
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